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Abstract 
We discuss several uses of blockchain (and, more generally, distributed 
ledger) technologies outside of cryptocurrencies with a pragmatic view. 
We mostly focus on three areas: the role of coin economies for what we 
refer to as data malls (specialized data marketplaces); data provenance 
(a historical record of data and its origins); and what we term keyless 
payments (made without having to know other users’ cryptographic 
keys). We also discuss voting and other areas, and give a sizable list of 
academic and nonacademic references.   
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1. Introduction 
Blockchain is a ledger for keeping a record of all transactions. It is a time-sequential chain of 
blocks containing transaction records. Blocks are linked using cryptography and time-stamping 
(see Figure 1). The data in a given block cannot be altered retroactively without altering all 
subsequent blocks,4 which makes blockchain resistant to modification of data by design. For 
historical reasons [Nakamoto, 2008],5 transactions in blockchain are usually thought of as 
relating to peer-to-peer (P2P) payments with blockchain as a distributed ledger maintained by a 
P2P network that itself validates new blocks. However, blockchain is not synonymous with 
payments or decentralization. A priori, blockchain can record other types of transactions. Also,  
blockchain need not be maintained by a P2P network but, instead, by a centralized authority.  
 In decentralized blockchain-based cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin (BTC) and Ethereum 
(ETH), verification of transactions by a P2P network is achieved via mining, a process whereby 
GPUs/CPUs solve computational problems. As part of this process, miners (among others) 
maintain copies of blockchain. Miners receive fees in respective cryptocurrencies. Mining is 
computationally and energy costly and has been argued to be inefficient and possibly even 
unsustainable as blockchain grows (see, e.g., [Bariviera, 2017], [Kostakis and Giotitsas, 2014], 
[Nadarajah and Chu, 2017], [Urquhart, 2016],  [Vranken, 2017]). In contrast, anticipated 
centralized government-issued cryptocurrencies (e.g., CryptoRuble) do not require mining and 
in some sense are more “efficient” as transactions are verified by a centralized authority (e.g., a 
central bank) [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017].6 In government-issued cryptocurrencies one of the 
main allures of decentralized cryptocurrencies – anonymity of transactions – is gone. However, 
employing blockchain (vs. traditional bank ledgers) can help prevent/reduce fraud, errors, etc. 
 The decentralized v. centralized cryptocurrency example highlights that, as with most 
things in life, whether using blockchain for solving a particular problem adds value depends on 
practical considerations and the answer can vary from instance to instance. In this article, we 
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discuss some potential applications of blockchain outside of cryptocurrencies from a pragmatic 
viewpoint. We mostly focus on three areas: the role of coin economies for data malls; data 
provenance; and what we term keyless payments. We also touch upon applications to voting.  
2. Data Malls 
Data marketplaces (or data markets) have been discussed in, e.g., [Balazinska, Howe and Suciu, 
2011], [Koutris et al, 2012], [Koutroumpis, Leiponen and Thomas, 2017], [Li et al, 2017], [Liu et 
al, 2017], [Maruyama, Okanohara and Hido, 2013], [Morrison et al, 2011], [Muschalle et al, 
2012], [Nakamura and Teramoto, 2015], [Perera et al, 2014a,b], [Schomm, Stahl and Vossen, 
2013], [Smith, Ofe and Sandberg, 2016], [Stahl, Löser and Vossen, 2015], [Stahl et al, 2016], [Yu 
and Zhang, 2017], [Zuiderwijk et al, 2014]. The idea of a data marketplace in the context of the 
Internet of Things (IoT) has recently gained traction with the IOTA Data Marketplace (IOTADM) 
[Schiener, 2017], [Sønstebø, 2017] launched by the IOTA Foundation [Ponciano, 2017], which 
circulates its own coin MIOTA.7 The technology underlying MIOTA and IOTADM is the so-called 
“Tangle”, which is a distributed ledger.8 IOTADM is an open and decentralized data lake (see, 
e.g., [IBD, 2017], [Ramakrishnan et al, 2017]) accessible to any paying party. Its scope is broad. 
 One of the challenges of broad data marketplaces is precisely their breadth of scope. 
E.g., it would be difficult to convince a mainstream capital markets professional to purchase 
stock market pricing data from a data marketplace that is a hodgepodge of vastly disparate 
data types (hypothetically) ranging from measurements made by a sensor mounted on a 
weather balloon hovering somewhere above Antarctica to some quantitative properties of 
bacteria found in the guts of livestock in remote regions of Tibet and everything in between… 
Furthermore, such broad data marketplaces based on data lakes would normally store data in 
its raw, unprocessed form,9 so the burden of making sense of such data (cleaning it, formatting 
it, etc.) falls on the end-user. For some applications (and industries) this may work just fine. But 
in other cases, e.g., in capital markets, finance, quantitative trading, etc., end-users desire more 
of a plug-and-play type of data, which they can utilize without expending prohibitive effort. 
                                                          
7
 As of January 6, 2018, MIOTA was ranked as #10 by market capitalization among all cryptocurrencies. See Table 1. 
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 However, it is a form of a direct acyclic graph (see, e.g., [Bang-Jensen and Gutin, 2009]) as opposed to blockchain.  
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 A (perhaps very) crude analogy would be an encyclopedia that is not alphabetical; or a search engine without 
some form of built-in backend intelligence for automatically determining what the end-user is searching for, which 
at times can be quite unstructured, e.g., in the form of a convoluted or ill-posed question, jumbled keywords, etc.  
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 More specialized outlets we refer to as Data Malls would appear to be more suitable for 
this purpose.10 For example, a Data Mall can act as a decentralized marketplace for various 
types of financial data (and datafeeds), but not as disparate as in the case of a general, 
hodgepodge type of a data marketplace. Furthermore, each data provider can normalize and 
format its data according to the adopted industry practices, so that the data is marketable and 
easy to use.11 In some cases, it may be beneficial to have normalized data descriptions (or 
“abstracts”) for ease of searching, classification, etc., with (automated) centralized verification. 
Such data need not be hosted in a data lake. Instead, it can be hosted on private nodes that the 
providers control. They choose what content to make public and what content to keep private. 
Decentralization then is not in dumping data using some kind of a distributed ledger – in most 
cases this is impracticable for a host of reasons, including the fact that data can be huge in size, 
not to mention issues that can arise with data provenance, disparate formatting, etc. Instead, 
decentralization is in creating a network that allows users to buy and sell data from each other 
directly, without a middleman. This is precisely where Coin Economies can play a pivotal role.      
3. Coin Economies   
So, in some sense, Data Malls provide a middle ground, a hybrid model, between the status quo 
and the radical idea of completely unstructured, hodgepodge data marketplaces based on data 
lakes. Blockchain (and similar distributed ledger) technologies can provide decentralized user 
networks connecting data sellers and buyers. A Coin Economy is a simple way of achieving this. 
 Thus, blockchain-based Ethereum smart contract technology (see, e.g., [Buterin, 2014], 
[Christidis and Devetsiokiotis, 2016], [Cuccuru, 2017], [Fairfield, 2014], [Koulu, 2016], [Levy, 
2017], [Marvin, 2016], [Mik, 2017], [Omohundro, 2014], [O’Shields, 2017], [Piasecki, 2016], 
[Raskin, 2017], [Savelyev, 2017], [Sillaber and Waltl, 2017], [Szabo, 1996, 1997], [Werbach and 
Cornell, 2017], [Wood, 2014], [Xie, 2017a,b]) has been used to create (P2P) networks of users 
with common interests. Here are 2 examples [Xie, 2017b]. Augur is a decentralized prediction 
market with an Ethereum token called Reputation (REP). REP is used to reward decentralized 
reporters (which are all REP holders) of the prediction market event outcomes. Those who 
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report outcomes incorrectly are penalized by taking away some of their REP holdings. Majority 
of REP holders have incentive to report outcomes correctly: otherwise REP would lose value. 
Another example is Golem, a network for renting out spare computing power to others, with its 
own token called Golem Network Token (GNT), which is used for payments on this network. 
 Much in the same spirit, Coin Economies can also be useful for decentralized Data Malls. 
The payments on a decentralized Data Mall network are made through its coin12 issued, say, via 
Ethereum. If this coin is exchange-traded, then a data vendor can convert tokens received from 
data sales into fiat currency, so in this case there is no issue with liquidity. Instead, there can be 
an issue with volatility – if the exchange-traded coin is volatile, the vendor can end up receiving 
less if the coin value drops (or more, if the coin value rises). There are ways to mitigate this via, 
e.g., employing derivatives hedging strategies such as buying put options on the coin (if such 
options are available for it), which is known as the “protective put” or “married put” strategy 
(see, e.g., [Cohen, 2005], [Figlewski, Chidambaran and Kaplan, 1993]). Alternatively, the vendor 
can hedge by selling futures (exchange traded) or a forward contract (over-the-counter) (see, 
e.g., [Hull, 2012]), if there is a market for such derivatives, thereby forgoing the upswing upside. 
 If the coin is not exchange-traded, then liquidity becomes an issue. After all, the vendor 
wishes to monetize its data, not just acquire illiquid tokens. There is an old-fashioned simple 
solution for this, akin the good ol’ Chuck E. Cheese tokens. Suppose a vendor collected   dollars 
worth of tokens through sales. With proof of sale, the token issuer will swap these tokens for   
dollars in fiat money,13 where (also see Figure 2) 
                                                                                
Here   is some reasonable predefined percentage. In essence,   resembles a sales commission 
percentage and the token issuer makes   dollars from the vendor’s sale, where 
                                                                                  
Except that  is paid not for sales, but for access to the network: the vendor “outsources” sales 
to the network, it is not required to hire salespeople, etc. The network creator gets rewarded 
for creating the network, just, e.g., as with Auger or Golem. Let us mention that Eqns. (1), (2) do 
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 By “coin” we mean coin or token and vice-versa, as may be applicable best. 
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 In practice, with, e.g., Ethereum-based tokens, this payment can be made in ether (ETH) and then the vendor 
can convert ETH to fiat money. Both the vendor and network creator have exchange rate exposure (see above). 
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not capture all transaction fees associated with the sale. E.g., with Ethereum-based tokens each 
user needs a wallet to transact in such a token, and transaction fees are paid to the Ethereum 
blockchain miner of the block containing the user’s smart contract. These transaction fees are 
paid in ETH [Ethereum, 2018] and used to be small, even recently [Young, 2017]. However, the 
cryptocurrency prices have skyrocketed lately, and so have the fees, including for ETH (see, e.g., 
[BitInfoCharts, 2018]). One issue with rapidly rising absolute (as opposed to relative to the ETH 
price) transaction fees is their adverse effects on the viability of micropayments using ETH. 
 Increasing transaction fees, so long as they remain within reason, albeit unpleasant, do 
not affect big-ticket data sales (e.g., a datafeed that costs $100,000/yr). But they can adversely 
affect small deals requiring micropayments. This includes pay-per-use cases such as access to 
blogs, research reports, etc., which can be valuable to a number of users provided that they are 
reasonably priced (with monetization through volume rather than high margins). Being able to 
make micropayments without incurring prohibitive transaction costs is paramount to such uses. 
 Are networks such as Ethereum going to adjust to the changing reality (cryptocurrency 
prices skyrocketing) and change the transaction fee structure? It is unclear how realistic this is  
considering that micropayments are not the biggest sources of revenues for the miners. There 
are efforts to fill this niche, e.g., μRaiden (MicroRaiden), which specializes in micropayments on 
the Ethereum network [Silver, 2017]. Unsurprisingly, this is an “off-blockchain” solution. In this 
regard, a Data Mall network creator may as well consider implementing its own solution. In 
fact, one may further argue that the entire blockchain solution can be implemented organically 
as opposed to using a network such as Ethereum. We can take this line of reasoning further and 
consider an organic blockchain solution with no mining: all transactions are verified by a central 
authority (the network creator), thereby completely eliminating transaction fees in P2P or B2B 
(business-to-business) payments.14 Micropayments are then no less viable than large payments. 
The network creator’s efforts are compensated via the fees collected from vendors (Eqn. (2)).  
 Would this not defy the purpose of blockchain – decentralization – in the first instance? 
This is not an “ideological” question but a pragmatic one.15 To the network creator the appeal 
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 One solution is to have 2 tokens: Ethereum-based “class A” for liquidity, and internal “class B” for transactions. 
The “class B” token need not be blockchain-based. It can be maintained in any database by the central authority.    
15
 In this regard, note that many cryptocurrencies (or, more precisely, coins/tokens) are not mined (see Table 1). 
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of the blockchain technology is mainly in that it does not have to reinvent the wheel and can 
use an open source solution as opposed to building its own ledger from scratch. For the users 
(both the vendors and the data consumers) it is not important that the transactions are mined – 
so long as the accounting is done right, it does not really matter whether it is done by miners or 
in a centralized fashion. In the context of a Data Mall, the users simply want a solution with 
lower costs. Blockchain can still play a sizable role from the users’ perspective (as opposed to 
that of the network creator) in this essentially “hybrid” approach: i) it provides a backbone for a 
decentralized Data Mall; and ii) it can record all transactions for transparency (without mining). 
 We emphasize that the “hybrid” approach we discuss above is not confined only to Data 
Malls but can have much broader applicability to other types of networks. Also, blockchain is 
not the only available approach and others have both been proposed and implemented. Ripple, 
for instance, is not based on blockchain; instead, it is a consensus based payment protocol (see, 
e.g., [Armknecht et al, 2015]). We already mentioned the IOTA Foundation’s Tangle technology 
above. There are other alternative technologies as well: Hashgraph (more centralized but also 
reportedly more scalable than blockchain) [Baird, 2016], the Ceptr project [P2P Foundation, 
2017], etc. A pragmatic approach to a given problem should dictate a solution, not “ideology”. 
4. Data Provenance  
 Data provenance/validation is one of the contemplated applications of blockchain (see, 
e.g., [Azaria et al, 2016], [Dooley, 2017], [ECS, 2017], [Gipp, Jagrut and Breitinger, 2016], [Kuo, 
Kim and Ohno-Machado, 2017], [Lemieux, 2016], [Liang et al, 2017], [Neisse, Steri and Nai-
Fovino, 2017], [Ramachandran and Kantarcioglu, 2017], [Rogers, 2015], [Wilkinson and Lowry, 
2014], [Zikratov et al, 2017], [Zyskind, Nathan and Pentland, 2015]). In this context, not all data 
can be treated on the same footing. Generally, when discussing large datasets, as we already 
alluded to above, it would be incorrect to assume that such datasets are stored in blockchain as 
this is simply impracticable. Furthermore, a P2P (or even B2B) network is simply not suited for 
validating many types of datasets in the first instance. Consider financial data, e.g., intraday tick 
data from NYSE (New York Stock Exchange). This dataset is large. Furthermore, this data is not 
something an average user can validate. There can be issues with this dataset as provided by a 
vendor or the exchange itself as errors can and do occur, without any malice or ill-intention on 
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any actor’s part. Depending on the type of error, it may or may not be corrected, and such a 
correction usually occurs at the institutional level. More generally, data vendors retroactively 
do correct errors in datasets and this is a well-known issue in, e.g., quantitative trading, where 
such retroactive corrections introduce “in-sampleness” into historical data. I.e., a quantitative 
researcher attempting to backtest a strategy may be working with different data than what 
would be available at the time the trading took place historically, and this can introduce biases 
into the backtest that are not even measurable. Usually such biases are small and one just lives 
with them. Así es la vida. It would be utterly impractical to put such a process on blockchain. 
 However, there are cases where blockchain could play a role in data provenance. In this 
regard, it is important to take a pragmatic approach and accept as a fact of life that populating 
blockchain with large data is impracticable. What is practicable is to place some much smaller 
metadata on blockchain. This metadata can, e.g., describe the changes made to the data. Wiki 
databases are viable examples of this application. Such databases can contain large amounts of 
data and it is impracticable to put it all on blockchain. Nor is there any pressing need to do so 
from a pragmatic viewpoint. However, recording the history/metadata associated with edits to 
such a wiki database can very well be practicable (assuming the recorded data is reasonably 
concise). E.g., the history of Wikipedia entry edits could possibly be recorded on blockchain. In 
fact, Everipedia is planning to convert to EOS blockchain (which will store not all information, 
but lighter data) while using the Interplanetary File System (IPFS) (for storing data-heavy files 
such as images and videos) [Del Castillo, 2017b], [Hertig, 2017], [Rubin, 2017], [Stanley, 2017]. 
 This kind of approach, which in principle is practicable, can be applied to other types of 
networks, including Data Malls. Whether using IPFS is required would depend on a given 
situation: notwithstanding the hype, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with private entities 
storing their data on secure servers, properly backed up, with failover protocols in place, etc. 
Not everything needs to be decentralized. Pragmatic considerations should be the guide in this.  
 Everipedia, which is Wikipedia’s main competitor, will also use its own token called “IQ” 
for payments on its network. IQ will be used to incentivize content creation. IQ is going to be 
minable: it will be mined by editors, curators, etc., by making accurate, valuable contributions 
to “the encyclopedia of everything”, as Everipedia refers to itself. This too is a Coin Economy. 
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5. Keyless Payments 
With a proliferation of cryptocurrencies and tokens, things got a bit “messier” than before. If 
one wishes to transfer, say, BTC (or any other cryptocurrency or token) to another person or 
entity, one needs to know the recipient’s virtually-impossible-to-remember BTC address. This 
very issue – conceptually, that is – existed well before cryptocurrencies: bank account numbers 
are also not something people carry in their memory. PayPal has a simple solution: a PayPal 
account is linked to an email address, bank account numbers are stored internally, so sending 
money to any user with a PayPal account requires knowing only the recipient’s email address. 
 The Venmo mobile app (Venmo was first acquired by Braintree in 2012 with PayPal 
acquiring Braintree in 2013 [Gillette, 2014]) has a model similar to PayPal. Various big banks 
internally provide a similar service using clearXchange/Zelle app technology [Robin, 2016]. 
Users who have Apple Pay set up can send money to each other using Apple’s iMessage 
[Chowdhry, 2017]. One can use Facebook Messenger to send money via PayPal [Gajanan, 
2017]. And so on. Conceptually, what all these services do is that they allow users to associate 
an email addresses or some other easy-to-remember IDs/handles with their digital wallets that 
store all the other required banking information (account numbers, routing numbers, etc.). 
 With cryptocurrencies and tokens one also deals with digital wallets. However, there is 
no service similar to PayPal or others described above where all one needs is the recipient’s  
email address or some other easy-to-remember ID/handle.16 A mobile app providing such a 
service would be very convenient. Just as with, say, PayPal, users would create digital wallets, 
which can include their various cryptocurrency addresses (and can also include bank accounts). 
Each wallet would have what we refer to as a Keyless Handle – an email address and/or some 
other easy-to-remember ID/handle – associated with it. Sending cryptocurrency (or fiat money) 
would require only knowing the recipient’s Keyless Handle. This is what we refer to as Keyless 
Payments. In this day and age, while a web-based service might be a plus, a mobile app would 
be required for Keyless Payments. This app can, e.g., be a multimedia messenger. Sending BTC, 
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 There are web-based services for sending BTC “by email”, etc., e.g., MoneyBadger.io. The sender provides the 
recipient’s email and sends BTC to a BTC address provided by MoneyBadger, then MoneyBadger sends an email 
with a code to the recipient, the recipient enters the code along with a cryptocurrency address (BTC, ETH, etc.) on 
MoneyBadger’s website, and MoneyBadger transfers the corresponding cryptocurrency to the recipient’s address. 
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ETH, other cryptocurrencies, tokens and fiat money would be as easy as sending a message.17 
Such a messenger may or may not be blockchain-based. In certain contexts a blockchain-based 
messenger can be useful, e.g., if messages must be indelibly logged for compliance purposes.  
 Let us emphasize that any centralized conversion service such as Keyless Payments can 
be prone to being hacked. However, conceptually, this is no different from blockchain actually 
not being an infallible solution when it comes to practical applications. Thus, while blockchain 
per se may be impractical to hack, e.g., exchanges where blockchain-based cryptocurrencies are 
traded can be and have been hacked. Mt. Gox’s infamous $460M disaster [McMillan, 2014] is 
only one example of cryptocurrency exchanges being hacked. The same applies to any digital 
wallet, whether it contains cryptographic keys, bank accounts or other sensitive information. A 
foolproof way of storing a cryptoasset is to deliberately forget its key. It is also utterly useless. 
In this regard, at least conceptually, Keyless Payments would be no different from PayPal, etc.18 
6. (Proxy) Voting 
A desire to apply blockchain to voting is natural considering its fraud-resistant nature. Such 
applications have been discussed in, e.g., [Barnes, Brake and Perry, 2016], [Ben Ayed, 2017], 
[Boucher, 2016], [Firth, 2017], [Gabison, 2016], [Higgins, 2017], [Koven, 2016], [Lee et al, 2016]. 
Here we will not delve into voting in the political context. Instead, we focus on corporate 
(proxy) voting. It is no secret that small shareholders are effectively disenfranchised for all 
intents and purposes (see, e.g., [Kakushadze, 2015], [Mourning, 2007], [Wilcox, 2004], [Wink 
and O’Leary, 2009]) as they either do not actually vote or, if they do, it is done though a proxy 
vote (see, e.g., [Investopedia, 2018]). This archaic process, especially when a proxy ballot and a 
proxy statement are sent by mail,19 is cumbersome and many small shareholders do not even 
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 For some literature on mobile payments, see, e.g., [Au, 2008], [Carton et al, 2012], [Chandra, Srivastava and 
Theng, 2010], [Chen, 2008], [Crowe, Rysman and Stavins, 2010], [Dahlberg et al, 2008], [De Albuquerque, Diniz and 
Cernev, 2014], [De Reuver et al, 2015], [Dennehy and Sammon, 2015], [Dewan and Chen, 2005], [Donner and 
Tellez, 2008], [Gowal and Gowal, 2014], [Hayashi, 2012], [Isaac, and Zeadally, 2014], [Jacob, 2007], [Jaradat and Al-
Mashaqba, 2014], [Karnouskos, 2004], [Karnouskos et al, 2008], [Kemp, 2013], [Kim, Mirusmonov and Lee, 2010], 
[Kreyer, Turowski and Pousttchi, 2003], [Laukkannen, 2008], [Liébana-Cabanillas, Sánchez-Fernández and Muñoz-
Leiva, 2014], [Liu, 2016], [Liu, Kauffman and Ma, 2015], [Lu et al, 2011], [Mallat, 2007], [Mallat and Tuunainen, 
2008], [Mbogo, 2010], [Niranjanamurthy, 2014], [Ondrus and Pigneur, 2006], [Polasik et al, 2013], [Pousttchi, 
2008], [Rodrigues et al, 2014], [Schierz, Schilke and Wirtz, 2010], [Shaw, 2014], [Shin, 2009], [Slade et al, 2015], 
[Tan et al, 2014], [Thakur and Srivastava, 2014]. See [Hanly, 2017] on Square accepting mobile payments in BTC. 
18
 Albeit one’s bank account enjoys robust protections from fraudulent activities, which cryptoassets do not afford. 
19
 Not to mention all the trees this kills.  
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bother. Large shareholders – the movers and shakers – then control the company without input 
from many smaller shareholders, who effectively are disenfranchised, even if unintentionally. 
 A foolproof online voting system would allow shareholders to be more engaged. This is 
where blockchain technology can be useful. There appears to be concrete progress made in this 
direction; see, e.g., [AST, 2017], [Crichton, 2017], [De, 2017a], [Kovlyagina and Yakovlev, 2016], 
[NASDAQ, 2017], [Rizzo, 2017]. This is an interesting application of blockchain technology. What 
remains to be seen is if it sticks. It is important to consider that without mining “many in-house 
blockchain solutions will be nothing more than cumbersome databases” [Hampton, 2016].20 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we discussed some applications and aspects of blockchain. Other applications 
have been contemplated. Table 2 summarizes a partial list of areas where blockchain has been 
or may be implemented. Some of these applications will probably withstand the test of time, 
some may not. What is clear is that blockchain technology has already made a huge impact – 
even though some of this impact could be very transient – and is likely to continue to do so for 
years to come as it appears to appeal to and excite scores of enthusiasts, entrepreneurs, mom-
and-pop as well as professional investors, technologists, scholars, futurists, etc. Perhaps one of 
the reasons is captured in by-now-“iconic” schematic depiction of “centralized vs. decentralized 
vs. distributed” (see Figure 3). Let us conclude with our message: “Pragmatism over Ideology!” 
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Figure 1. A schematic depiction of blockchain. Attribution: By B140970324 (Own work) [CC BY-
SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons. Image 
source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3a/Blockchain_workflow.png. 
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Figure 2. A schematic depiction of a Data Mall network. NC = network creator; V = data vendor; 
B = data buyer. Solid lines represent token payments from vendors to the network creator and 
fiat money (or exchange-traded coin) payments from the network creator to the vendors (see 
Section 3). Smaller dashed lines represent token payments from buyers from vendors and data 
provision by vendors to buyers. Larger dashed lines represent miscellaneous interactions 
between buyers and the network creator. Dotted lines represent miscellaneous interactions 
between buyers. Each buyer may acquire data from more than one vendor. A vendor can also 
be a buyer and acquire data from another vendor. And so on.   
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Figure 3. A schematic depiction of “centralized vs. decentralized vs. distributed”. Attribution: 
1983~enwiki at English Wikipedia [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC-BY-SA-3.0 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) or CC BY-SA 2.5-2.0-1.0 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5-2.0-1.0)], via Wikimedia Commons. Image 
source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Centralised-decentralised-
distributed.png.  
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Rank Name Symbol Market Cap, $B Price, $ Volume (24h), $M Mined 
1 Bitcoin BTC 289.156 17,226.10 20,295 Yes 
2 Ripple XRP 119.344 3.08 4,135 No 
3 Ethereum ETH 101.746 1,050.98 5,269 Yes 
4 Bitcoin Cash BCH 47.069 2,785.68 1,635 Yes 
5 Cardano ADA 26.602 1.03 365 No 
6 Litecoin LTC 16.590 303.61 2,374 Yes 
7 NEM XEM 14.663 1.63 119 No 
8 Stellar XLM 12.950 0.724340 595 No 
9 TRON TRX 11.414 0.173607 2,675 No 
10 IOTA MIOTA 10.993 3.96 181 No 
Table 1. Top 10 cryptocurrencies by market capitalization. The data (market capitalization and 
volume are rounded) is taken from [CoinMarketCap, 2018] as of approximately 11:51 PM EST 
on January 6, 2018. Note that cryptocurrency prices are volatile and this data is a snapshot. 
 
Use Some references (also see references therein) 
Decentralized cryptocurrencies See Section 1, [Andreesen, 2014], [Krugman, 2013], 
[Vigna and Casey, 2015], [Wang and Vergne, 2017] 
Government-issued cryptocurrencies See Section 1 
Financial transactions (other than 
cryptocurrencies) 
[De, 2017b], [Del Castillo, 2017a], [Martin, 2016], 
[Rohlfing and Davis, 2017], [Ito, Narula and Ali, 2017] 
Supply chains [Crosby et al, 2016], [Nash, 2016], [Tian, 2017] 
Social networking [Olenski, 2017], [Tapscott and Tapscott, 2016] 
Business processes/management [Beck et al, 2017], [Guo and Liang, 2016], [Mendling et 
al, 2017], [Prybila et al, 2017], [Weber et al, 2016]  
Governance [Atzori, 2017], [Piazza, 2017], [Yermack, 2017] 
Prediction markets See Section 3 
Voting See Section 6 
Proxy voting See Section 6 
Medical records [Al Omar et al, 2017], [Azaria et al, 2016], [Hoy, 2017], 
[Orcutt, 2017], [Xia et al, 2017], [Yue et al, 2016] 
Smart contracts See Section 3 
Data Malls See Sections 2 and 3 
Data marketplaces (IoT) See Section 2 
Shared computing See Section 3 
Company incorporation/registration [Roberts, 2017], [Ryan, 2015], [Vigna, 2016] 
Copyrighted works distribution [MBW, 2017], [Willms, 2016], [Zellinger, 2016] 
Data storage/transfer [Ali et al, 2017], [Callahan, 2017], [Romano and Schmid, 
2017], [Sengupta et al, 2016], [Suberg, 2017] 
Data provenance See Section 4 
Decentralized Autonomous 
Organizations 
[Chohan, 2015], [Deegan, 2014], [DuPont, 2018], 
[Harrison, 2016], [Jentzsch, 2016], [Merkle, 2016] 
Table 2. A partial list of the areas with (potential) blockchain uses. 
